Cryptanalytic Flaws in Oh et al.’s ID-Based Authenticated Key Agreement Protocol
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CONTRIBUTORS:
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PROCEEDINGS TITLE:
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YEAR:
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2008
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PUB TYPE:
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Conference Paper in Proceedings
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PAGES:
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458 -
467
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SUBJECT(S):
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None
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DISCIPLINE:
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Computer Science
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HTTP:
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LANGUAGE:
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English
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PUB ID:
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103-447-266
(Last edited on
2009/01/03 17:14:07 US/Mountain)
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SPONSOR(S):
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ABSTRACT:
A key agreement protocol is designed for two or more entities to agree upon a shared secret key, which is used to preserve confidentiality and data integrity over an open network. In 2007, Oh et al. proposed an efficient ID-based authenticated key agreement protocol on elliptic
curve pairings, which is believed to be able to generate two session keys securely after a protocol execution. However, we discover that their protocol is in fact susceptible to the basic impersonation attack as well as
the key compromise impersonation attack. In this paper, we present the imperfections of Oh et al.’s scheme and subsequently we suggest a slight modification to the scheme which would resolve the problems.
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STATISTICS
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