Cryptanalysis of Improved One-round Lin-Li's Tripartite Key Agreement Protocol
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CONTRIBUTORS:
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PROCEEDINGS TITLE:
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YEAR:
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2008
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PUB TYPE:
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Conference Paper in Proceedings
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PAGES:
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1916 -
1921
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SUBJECT(S):
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None
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DISCIPLINE:
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Computer Science
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HTTP:
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LANGUAGE:
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English
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PUB ID:
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103-442-452
(Last edited on
2008/05/02 23:41:46 GMT-6)
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SPONSOR(S):
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ABSTRACT:
A tripartite authenticated key agreement protocol is
designedfor three entities to communicate securely over an
open network particularly with a shared key. Recently, we
have improved a one-round tripartite authenticated key
agreementprotocolproposed by Lin-Li due to its vulnerability to theforging attack in our previous report. However, we have later discovered that both the original Lin-Li's scheme and our previous enhanced protocol are vulnerable to the insider replay attack. Moreover, we have also realized that both protocols have falsely claimed the forward secrecy attribute. In this paper, we will revise our improvements and again secure this protocol against these cryptanalytic attacks while recovering the precious perfectforward secrecy property.
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STATISTICS
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