On Security Proof of McCullagh-Barreto's Key Agreement Protocol and its Variants
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CONTRIBUTORS:
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JOURNAL:
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International Journal of Networks and Security (Special Issue on Cryptography in Networks),
2(3/4),
?? - ??.
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YEAR:
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2007
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PUB TYPE:
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Journal Article
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SUBJECT(S):
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None
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DISCIPLINE:
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Computer Science
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HTTP:
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http://eprint.iacr.org/2005/201/
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LANGUAGE:
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English
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PUB ID:
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103-430-938
(Last edited on
2006/11/12 15:48:53 US/Mountain)
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SPONSOR(S):
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ABSTRACT:
McCullagh and Barreto presented an identity-based authenticated key agreement protocol in CT-RSA 2005. Their protocol was found to be vulnerable to a key-compromise impersonation attack. In order to recover the weakness, McCullagh and Barreto, and Xie proposed two variants of the protocol respectively. In each of these works, a security proof of the proposed protocol was presented. In this paper, we revisit these three security proofs and show that all the reductions in these proofs are invalid, because the property of indistinguishability between their simulation and the real world was not held. As a replacement, we slightly modify the McCullagh and Barreto's second protocol and then formally analyse the security of the modified scheme in the Bellare-Rogaway key agreement model.
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STATISTICS
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