CHOO (2005) Revisit Of McCullagh--Barreto Two-Party ID-Based Authenticated Key Agreement Protocols

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Revisit Of McCullagh--Barreto Two-Party ID-Based Authenticated Key Agreement Protocols

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CONTRIBUTORS:

Author:

CHOO, KIM-KWANG RAYMOND (Australian Institute of Criminology)

JOURNAL:

International Journal of Network Security, 1(3), 154 - 160.

YEAR:

2005

PUB TYPE:

Journal Article

SUBJECT(S):

None

DISCIPLINE:

Computer Science

HTTP:

http://ijns.nchu.edu.tw/contents/ijns-v1-n3/ijns-v1-n3.html

LANGUAGE:

English

PUB ID:

103-429-564 (Last edited on 2006/11/12 16:04:13 US/Mountain)

SPONSOR(S):

ABSTRACT:
We revisit the two-party ID-based authenticated key agreement protocol and its variant resistant to key-compromise impersonation due to McCullagh & Barreto, which carries a proof of security in the Bellare & Rogaway (1993) model. In this paper, we demonstrated why both the protocol and its variant are not secure if the adversary is allowed to send a Reveal query to reveal non-partner players who had accepted the same session key (i.e., termed as a key-replicating attack in Krawczyk (2005)). We also demonstrate that both protocols do not achieve the key integrity property due to Janson & Tsudik (1995).

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