CHOO (2006) On the (In)Security of Lee, Kim, Kim, & Oh (2005) Key Agreement Protocol

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On the (In)Security of Lee, Kim, Kim, & Oh (2005) Key Agreement Protocol

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CONTRIBUTORS:

Author:

CHOO, KIM-KWANG RAYMOND (Australian Institute of Criminology)

JOURNAL:

International Journal of Network Security, 3(1), 85 - 94.

YEAR:

2006

PUB TYPE:

Journal Article

SUBJECT(S):

None

DISCIPLINE:

Computer Science

HTTP:

http://ijns.nchu.edu.tw/contents/ijns-v3-n1/ijns-v3-n1.html

LANGUAGE:

English

PUB ID:

103-429-562 (Last edited on 2006/08/24 18:17:25 GMT-6)

SPONSOR(S):

ABSTRACT:
In ICCSA 2005, Lee, Kim, Kim, & Oh (2005) proposed a new (two-party) ID-based key agreement protocol, which they claimed to provide known key security resilience, forward secrecy, key compromise resilience, unknown key share resilience, and key control, however, without providing any security proofs. In this work, we demonstrate that their claims of known key security resilience and key control are flawed by revealing previously unpublished flaw in the two-party ID-based key agreement protocol. We may speculate that such (trivial) errors could have been found by protocol designers if proofs of security were to be constructed, and hope this work will encourage future protocol designers to provide proofs of security. We conclude with a countermeasure due to Choo, Boyd, & Hitchcock (2005).

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