CHOO, BOYD, HITCHCOCK and MAITLAND (2004) On Session Identifiers in Provably Secure Protocols: The Bellare-Rogaway Three-Party Key Distribution Protocol Revisited

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On Session Identifiers in Provably Secure Protocols: The Bellare-Rogaway Three-Party Key Distribution Protocol Revisited

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CONTRIBUTORS:

	Author:	CHOO, KIM-KWANG RAYMOND (Australian Institute of Criminology)
	Author:	BOYD, COLIN
	Author:	HITCHCOCK, YVONNE
	Author:	MAITLAND, GREG

PROCEEDINGS TITLE:

4th Conference on Security in Communication Networks - SCN 2004 (Volume 3352/2005 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science)

YEAR:

2004

PUB TYPE:

Conference Paper in Proceedings

PAGES:

352 - 367

SUBJECT(S):

None

DISCIPLINE:

Computer Science

HTTP:

http://eprint.iacr.org/2004/345

LANGUAGE:

English

PUB ID:

103-429-557 (Last edited on 2006/08/24 18:10:28 GMT-6)

SPONSOR(S):

ABSTRACT:
We examine the role of session identifiers (SIDs) in security proofs for key establishment protocols. After reviewing the practical importance of SIDs we use as a case study the three-party server-based key distribution (3PKD) protocol of Bellare and Rogaway, proven secure in 1995. We show incidentally that the partnership function used in the existing security proof is flawed. There seems to be no way to define a SID for the 3PKD protocol that will preserve the proof of security. A small change to the protocol allows a natural definition for a SID and we prove that the new protocol is secure using this SID to define partnering.

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