Formal Analysis of Secure Contracting Protocol for E-Tendering
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CONTRIBUTORS:
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PROCEEDINGS TITLE:
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YEAR:
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2006
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PUB TYPE:
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Conference Paper in Proceedings
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PAGES:
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155 -
164
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SUBJECT(S):
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None
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DISCIPLINE:
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Computer Science
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HTTP:
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http://crpit.com/Vol54.html
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LANGUAGE:
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English
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PUB ID:
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103-429-549
(Last edited on
2006/08/24 17:51:09 GMT-6)
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SPONSOR(S):
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ABSTRACT:
Formal specification and verification of protocols have been credited for uncovering protocol flaws; revealing inadequacies in protocol design of the Initial Stage and Negotiation Stage; and proved that improved protocol performs in the desired manner while under modelled attacks from dishonest players. It also shows how formal methods can be used by protocol designer to achieve a better design of a complex system. Formal methods can also populate an abstract concept with a more complete and consistent protocol specification. Complex system protocol can be easily specified with simplifying assumptions for a high level of protocol verification. This set of assumptions can then be used to further explore the protocol. Using formal methods for complex secure system protocol design will provide not only better quality protocol but could also be the first step in advancing an abstract concept to a more practical stage for development.
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