CHOO (2006) Refuting Security Proofs for Tripartite Key Exchange with Model Checker in Planning Problem Setting

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Refuting Security Proofs for Tripartite Key Exchange with Model Checker in Planning Problem Setting

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CONTRIBUTORS:

Author:

CHOO, KIM-KWANG RAYMOND (Australian Institute of Criminology)

PROCEEDINGS TITLE:

19th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop - CSFW 2006

YEAR:

2006

PUB TYPE:

Conference Paper in Proceedings

PAGES:

297 - 308

SUBJECT(S):

None

DISCIPLINE:

Computer Science

HTTP:

http://csdl2.computer.org/persagen/DLAbsToc.jsp?resourcePath=/dl/proceedings/&toc=comp/proceedings/csfw/2006/2615/00/2615toc.xml&DOI=10.1109/CSFW.2006.26

LANGUAGE:

English

PUB ID:

103-429-545 (Last edited on 2006/08/24 17:29:39 GMT-6)

SPONSOR(S):

ABSTRACT:
We encode a simplified version of the Canetti and Krawczyk (2001) formalism using Asynchronous Product Automata (APA). We then use a model checker tool, Simple Homomorphism Verification Tool (SHVT), to perform state-space analysis on our Automata in the setting of the planning problem. As a case study, we revisit two tripartite key exchange protocols of Hitchcock, Boyd, and Gonzalez Nieto (2004), which carry claimed security proofs in the Canetti and Krawczyk (2001) model. We refute their proofs of security by pointing out previously unpublished flaws in the protocols using SHVT. We then point out corresponding flaws in the refuted proofs.

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