Das Arrow-Unmöglichkeitstheorem und das Phänomen des leeren Kerns in Abstimmungsverfahren
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CONTRIBUTORS:
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JOURNAL:
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Arbeitspapiere aus der Evangelischen Fachhochschule Darmstadt,
1(1),
1 -
15.
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YEAR:
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2004
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PUB TYPE:
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Journal Article
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SUBJECT(S):
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arrow paradoxon, democracy, university
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DISCIPLINE:
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Political Science
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HTTP:
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LANGUAGE:
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German
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PUB ID:
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103-427-130
(Last edited on
2006/05/30 05:32:41 GMT-6)
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SPONSOR(S):
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ABSTRACT:
The Arrow Paradox and the problem of the empty core is of central importance in political economics. They both deal with rules of aggregation via voting for individual preferences in order to arrive at a collective decision which reflects personal preferences. The core of a decision making problem consists of collective decisions, which cannot be improved on by coalitions of involved parties voting differently. It is evident that there are an abundance of problems in decision making which are typified by an empty core. In these cases either no decision or a random decision is reached. More generally, Arrow demonstrated in his famous paradox that no democratic voting rules can be designed which concurrently fulfil the four demands of universal validity, Pareto efficiency, independence of irrelevant alternatives and non-dictatorship. In general, therefore, random decisions or blocking decisions in a very general sense are possible. This will be demonstrated using the example of short-listing for a University Professor. It will also be shown what particular demands this makes on the cooperative culture of the University and on the arrangement of the regulation of self government.
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