Ordnungsverschiedenheit des Vorstellungsinhaltes in der Gegenstandstheorie Alexius Meinongs
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CONTRIBUTORS:
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JOURNAL:
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YEAR:
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2005
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PUB TYPE:
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Journal Article
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SUBJECT(S):
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philosophy, ontology, Graz school, Alexius Meinong, Gestalt psychology, Gestalt theory
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DISCIPLINE:
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Philosophy
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HTTP:
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http://gestalttheory.net/gth/
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LANGUAGE:
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German
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PUB ID:
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103-419-621
(Last edited on
2005/09/05 05:01:08 GMT-6)
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SPONSOR(S):
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ABSTRACT:
For Meinong an intentional act always points towards an object. In order to grasp this object, an intentional act in all cases needs a psychical content. The content is that part of the total Erlebnis, which changes or remains, when the object of the act changes or remains respectively. It serves therefore for grasping the object, but it is no copy of the object in the consciousness.
Meinong's theory detects moreover a variety of objects, that differ on their order’s highness. Higher-order objects are founded by lower-order objects. Higher-order objects are therefore founded objects (also called: Gestaltqualitäten, figural qualities). In order to grasp those objects, it is assumed by Meinong that a mental activity (which he calls Vorstellungsproduktion)
produces higher-order contents. An ontological analysis of the notion content is to show that the thesis of the existence of higher-order contents is highly problematic and that the content can’t bear such an higher-order structure. Consequently, the content must be ontologically
defi ned as a psychic object which is part of the total Erlebnis. This is a present and real object that can’t be grasped by an act of presentation.
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