Mona Lisa's Smile. The Place of Experimental Phenomenology within Gestalt Theory
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ABSTRACT:
For some time, brilliant research from the Gestalt-derived Italian school of experimental psychology has been calling itself ‘Experimental Phenomenology.’
This has been a complex process of identity management, encompassing: (1) the restated belief in the Gestalt commitment to phenomenological analysis to accompany psychological analysis, (2) a distancing from KÖHLER’s orthodox Berlin brain physiology, and (3) a sentimental
rediscovery of the ‘native’ phenomenological tradition of Austro-Hungarian psychology (of which Trieste was a part and Vittorio BENUSSI the most important representative) in opposition to Berlin Gestalt psychology.
My paper deals with two issues: (1) is what goes under the name of Experimental Phenomenology in Italy actually that? and (2) is a phenomenological reform of Gestalt psychology
necessary or advised?
As to the first question, I believe that part of Italian Experimental Phenomenology is not actually pure phenomenology but rather experimental science concerned with formulating principles of behavior. This raises the second question. If Experimental Phenomenology is not
exactly that, how relevant is its theoretical framework?
Departing from defenses of Experimental Phenomenology, I will show how its aims are not too different from those of Berlin Gestalt psychology and that this leaves open the question of a complementary philosophical backing to Gestalt theory, which the defenders of experimental
phenomenology seem to be really after.
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