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ABSTRACT:
Nobody is exactly sure how philosophically to defend Gestalt theory. Attention has varied between Continental Phenomenology (late Husserl, Merleau-Ponty) and Austrian Realism (Brentano, Meinong, Benussi, early Husserl), cutting a wide swath of alternatives. One can see the need for some resolution by reading the home-grown reconstructions sometimes offered. Donald Campbell's (1989) discussion of the “moral epistemology” of Solomon Asch, for example, has no shortage of philosophical categories but one feels at the same time a strange lack of recognition with the theorist described.
In the various philosophical fields there are promising affinities and leads. No one, however, represents in their philosophical output the (1) metaphysical “intelligible holism,” (2) the phenomenally realist and critical realist epistemology and (3) moral objectivism that is gestalt theory except Maurice Mandelbaum. This is because he was critically influenced by his mentor Köhler but also because he himself responded to this world view in his own significant way. The fact that he did not advertise his gestalt membership should not make us hesitate in reaping the benefits of seeing greater coherence in his work and seeing a better philosophical defense of laboratory psychological work.
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