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CONTRIBUTORS:
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CONFERENCE NAME:
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CONF. LOCATION:
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Graz Austria
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CONFERENCE YEAR:
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2005
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PUB TYPE:
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Conference Presentation
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SUBJECT(S):
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cognitive sciences, neuroscience, phenomenology, Gestalt psychology, Gestalt theory
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DISCIPLINE:
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Psychology
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HTTP:
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http://gestalttheory.net/conv/
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LANGUAGE:
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English
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PUB ID:
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103-413-439
(Last edited on
2006/01/04 04:53:23 US/Mountain)
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SPONSOR(S):
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ABSTRACT:
I'll assume the Jackendoff’s argument about the explanatory gap in the cognitive sciences: taken for granted that the right account for the mind-body problem has been given, it seems to fail solving the computational / phenomenological mind problem. That is the explanation of which brain conditions must occur to have this or that meaning / value experience. My argument is that neurosciences’ findings allow us to fill this gap. It is likely to come to give a scientific account not only for the way meanings, categorizations, norm dependent values emerge from patterns of brain functions, but also for the conditions at which we make experience thereof.
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