Walter (2001) Zur Bedeutung der Begriffe „physikalisch“, „transphänomenal“ und „Wirklichkeit im 1. Sinne“

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Zur Bedeutung der Begriffe „physikalisch“, „transphänomenal“ und „Wirklichkeit im 1. Sinne“

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CONTRIBUTORS:

Author:

Walter, Hans-Juergen P (Society for Gestalt Theory and its Applications (GTA))

JOURNAL:

Gestalt Theory - An International Multidisciplinary Journal, 23(2), 102 - 114.

YEAR:

2001

PUB TYPE:

Journal Article

SUBJECT(S):

epistemology, phenomenology, Gestalt psychology, Gestalt Theory, Gestalt Theoretical Psychotherapy

DISCIPLINE:

Psychology

HTTP:

http://gestalttheory.net/gth/

LANGUAGE:

German

PUB ID:

103-412-807 (Last edited on 2005/07/02 12:08:23 GMT-6)

SPONSOR(S):

ABSTRACT:
Following the critical-realistic and Gestalt theoretical view of KÖHLER and METZGER one cannot maintain the traditional distinction between the “physical“ and at the same time “transphenomenal“ world on the one hand and the “phenomenal“ world on the other hand. Moreover it is appropriate to understand the “phenomenal“ world as a specific part (microcosm) of the one all-including “physical macrocosm“. Consequently, the “physical“ world no longer can be seen on principle as “transphenomenal“; which means, that e.g. emotions are “physical“ and “phenomenal“ attributes at the same time, and only that part of the world which physics traditionally search into, is (perhaps totally) “transphenomenal“. In METZGER’s “Psychology“ chapter 1, when introducing the concept of “reality in the 1st sense“ and “reality in the 2nd sense“, METZGER still follows the traditional distinction between a “physical“ and at the same time “transphenomenal“ world (that part of world which is to be researched by the physicist) on the one hand and a “phenomenal“ world (that part of the world which can be experienced by human beings) on the other hand; However, in chapter 8 it becomes clear, that this was a preliminary or temporary definition only. The “realities in the 2nd sense“ are always parts of the all-including “reality in the 1st sense“. This conception is also maintained by KÖHLER’s differentiating of “epistemological dualism“. He proves that confidence in the results of searching into “transphenomenal“ (e.g. organic) facts is only justified, if “phenomenal reality“ is akin to “transphenomenal reality; if phenomenal formations of a concept (because human beings can have no other) are providing the understanding and the representation of transphenomenal facts.

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