De ontwikkeling van het sociaal-economische overleg in het interbellum. De syndicale macht in de exportgerichte sectoren als een verklarende factor
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ABSTRACT:
The trade union density is a simplified, but practical and representative indicator to 'measure' union power. The Belgian trade union density during the interwar years is not at all thoroughly measured or studied for different reasons. Keeping some methodological remarks in mind, we modelled the Belgian data. The trade union density in the period between World War I and II evolved from a peak in 1921 (38.6%) over a low in 1928 (26%) to 34.6% in 1939. This development varies on a disaggregated level. This is the case in both regional and sectoral respects, as well as between the two major unions separately. While the Christian trade unions were in a low right after World War I, these unions evolved into a fierce competitor for the socialist trade unions after 1925. The specific regional and sectoral implantation especially advantaged the Christian trade unions during the enormous unemployment in
the thirties.
The combination of too many variables and too few cases and the sectoral regrouping force us to be careful when interpreting the results of the differences in trade union density between the economic sectors. Nonetheless, it is noticeable that the trade union density strongly differs in
size as well as in stability, between the domestic and international sectors. On the one hand the international sectors have a larger trade union density, but on the other hand this density is less stable than in the domestic sectors. The mining industry, however, does constitute an exception within the international sector. This difference between the domestic and international sectors as far as the trade union density goes, probably explains the origin of social bargaining in Belgium to some extent.
Qualitative research revealed that the international sectors have a relatively higher industrial concentration, capital intensity, average company size and job risk than the domestic sectors. These industrial characteristics usuallylower the organisational costs for the unions and therefore indirectly encourage union membership. This explains the higher trade union density in the international sector, but does not explain the lower stability. The international sectors are more exposed to the risks of the international economy. Joining the Ghent system or the voluntary unemployment insurance, in which the unions had a near-monopoly, was a way for employees to protect themselves from these risks. The larger fluctuations in the trade union density within the international sectors consequently mirrored the success of the Ghent system as a response to the hazards of the
international economy. Social bargaining was another remedy to restrict the negative consequences of the larger opening rate of the Belgian economy.
The bargaining coverage of the collective agreements is more extensive in the international sector than in the domestic sector. For various reasons, both employers and unions of the international sector had advantages in entering into collective agreements. But at first especially) the employers (in the international sector) tried to escape from it all by for instance increasing
wages on their own initiative and by setting up compensation funds for children's allowances. Only later did employers accept social bargaining. Especially the unions in the international sector played an important role in the institutionalisation of social bargaining. Their relatively large capacity of power and their corresponding strike ability contributed to a more extensive bargaining coverage of the collective agreements and the institutionalisation of social bargaining. Through lower organizational costs, the unions indirectly owed their (potential) power (paradoxically) to the characteristics
of the international sectors.
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STATISTICS
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