Organization theory and the market for corporate control: a dynamic analysis of the characteristics of large takeover targets, 1980-1990
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CONTRIBUTORS:
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JOURNAL:
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YEAR:
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1992
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PUB TYPE:
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Journal Article
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SUBJECT(S):
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Corporate-control; Corporate-acquisitions-and-mergers-United-States; Organizational-change; Organization
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DISCIPLINE:
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No discipline assigned
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HTTP:
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LANGUAGE:
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English
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PUB ID:
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103-343-942
(Last edited on
2005/03/10 10:22:38 US/Mountain)
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SPONSOR(S):
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ABSTRACT:
The way corporate takeovers are accomplished and why they are not easily accommodated by existing organizational theories is examined. The factors that made organizations vulnerable to takeovers during the 1980s were analyzed by using event-history techniques on time-series data covering all takeover bids for Fortune 500 firms from January 1980 to December 1990. Greater organizational slack, age, and the presence of a chief financial officer were found to increase the risk of takeover. Risk was reduced with family control and financial characteristics like higher market-to-book ratio. Bank control and intercorporate network ties seemed to have no effect on takeover risk. Theory about organizations and environments has been premised on an assumption of managerialism that is no longer tenable. It must adjust to the financial model of the corporation that now dominates economic and policy discourse.
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STATISTICS
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