Collective bargaining in professional basketball: an empirical investigation
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ABSTRACT:
The development of collective bargaining in professional basketball is traced to see how the players have increased their bargaining power and, subsequently, their salaries. An empirical model of salary determination demonstrates that player compensation is based on both performance and non-performance factors such as draft round and seniority. Traces the development of collective bargaining in professional basketball in order to determine how players have increased their bargaining power and, as a result, increased their salaries. Collects salary data, performance data, and non-performance information for example seniority, draft round) on National Basketball Association players (n=210) during the 1984-85 season. Using an empirical model of salary determination, demonstrates that player salaries are partly influenced by 'on the court' performance, but that non-participation factors are also relevant. Speculates about the impact of the 'first refusal' system and the 'salary cap' concept on the player salary determination process.
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